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“By moving off of the sidelines, where we are now, and sitting at the
table of nations that have ceded to this treaty, we can defend our
interests, we can lead the discussions, and we would be able to influence
those treaty bodies that develop and interpret the Law of the Sea.”
—Former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta1
I. INTRODUCTION
In early 2018, Nautilus Minerals’ Solwara 1 Project (Solwara 1 Project) will
become the world’s first deep seabed mining operation to successfully extract
valuable resources from the seafloor.2 As of today, no other successful deep
seabed mining operation exists.3 With technologically feasible deep seabed
mining operations on the horizon, nations will look to an international legal
regime to govern these mining activities.4 The frontrunner and most
internationally recognized candidate to fill that role will likely be the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 (UNCLOS).5
A total of 167 nations have ratified UNCLOS since 1982.6 A few of the
ratifying nations include the United Kingdom of Great Britain, Chile, Germany,
Mozambique, Russian Federation, Maldives, and China.7 A glaring absence
among this extensive list is the United States of America who, despite being
greatly involved in developing UNCLOS, has for nearly 33 years resisted the
ratification of the convention.8 Notwithstanding bipartisan support and calls for
1. PRACHI NAIK, THE LAW OF THE SEA; KEY QUOTATIONS, AMERICAN SECURITY PROJECT (Jun. 27,
2012), available at http://www.americansecurityproject.org/the-law-of-the-sea-convention-key-quotations/ (on
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
2. Matthew Keevil, Nautilus Targets 2018 For Undersea Mining, THE NORTHERN MINER (Apr. 15,
2015), available at http://www.northernminer.com/news/nautilus-targets-2018-undersea-production-at-solwara/
1003570693/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
3. See Jort Van Wijk, Meeting the Challenges of Deep-Sea Mining, SEATECHNOLOGY MAGAZINE (last
visited on Oct. 21, 2015), available at http://www.sea-technology.com/features/2012/0312/mining_
challenges.php (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). Many challenges prevent other deep
seabed mining operations from being successful. These challenges include fundamental physics of the
hyperbaric cutting of rock, physics of vertical two-phase flows containing large solid particles, flow assurance
and positioning, and control of the subsea mining tool and vertical transport system.
4. Keevil, supra note 2; OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL, NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC
ADMINISTRATION, SEABED MANAGEMENT (last visited Oct. 21, 2015), available at http://www.gc.noaa.gov/
gcil_seabed_management.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
5. Koji Sekimizu, Address by Mr. Koji Sekimuzu, Secretary-General of the International Maritime
Organization, INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION (Mar. 18, 2014), available at http://www.imo.org/
en/MediaCentre/SecretaryGeneral/SpeechesByTheSecretaryGeneral/Pages/itlos.aspx (on file with The University of
Pacific Law Review).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Sunil Agarwal, Prospects of a Paradigm Shift in the American Policy Towards UN Convention on the
Law of the Sea: Potential Implications, NATIONAL MARITIME FOUNDATION 1, 6 (Apr. 15, 2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1866113 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining the
involvement of the U.S. in the development of UNCLOS).
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ratification by several U.S. presidents, the lack of U.S. Senate approval has
proven to be a significant barrier in taking the final step towards ratification.9
As more nations join in the ratification of UNCLOS and the realization of
deep seabed mining becomes more apparent, the U.S.’s resistance to join the
convention will cause it to forgo “an opportunity to extend its sovereign rights
over adjoining continental shelf.”10 Furthermore, such continued non-ratification
by the U.S. will “simultaneously [abdicate] an opportunity [for the U.S.] to play a
significant role in formal deliberations in the UNCLOS institutions.”11 The
failure to ratify the convention is largely due to a “handful of ideologues” from
the Senate who see UNCLOS as “an assault on U.S. sovereignty” and the
misbelief that the original objections by President Reagan in 1982 have yet to be
rectified.12
The U.S. Senate should immediately ratify UNCLOS to extend and obtain
international recognition of U.S. sovereignty to continental shelf resources
through deep seabed mining. Ratifying UNCLOS will re-establish itself as a
world leader in shaping the rule of law in the oceans.13 Part II provides a history
of UNCLOS, including its origins and subsequent redevelopment in the early
1990’s to address concerns regarding deep seabed mining.14 Part III summarizes
the pertinent parts of UNCLOS and deep seabed mining.15 Part IV examines
recent developments in deep seabed mining technology, such as the Solwara 1
Project, and how its realization is significant to the U.S.’s current status as a nonmember to UNCLOS.16 Part V describes the U.S.’s unsuccessful attempt to
circumvent UNCLOS and how the international landscape stands today.17 Part VI
discusses the case for the ratification of UNCLOS and why critics’ concerns are
antiquated and overstated.18 Part VII calls for the immediate ratification of
UNCLOS by the U.S. Senate to strengthen U.S. sovereignty and leadership in the
ocean’s affairs.19

9. Id. at 8 (providing a basis for why the ratification of UNCLOS fails when it reaches the U.S. Senate).
10. Id. at 12 (describing the detriments to the U.S. in its continued absence as a party to UNCLOS).
11. See id.
12. Raul Pedrozo, Arctic Climate Change and U.S. Accession to the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea, 89 INT’L L. STUD. 757, 762–63 (2013) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review)
(explaining who the opponents are of UNCLOS in the U.S. government and why they oppose its ratification).
13. See generally Agarwal, supra note 8, at 12–14 (providing the benefits that will be realized when the
U.S. ratifies UNCLOS); see also id. (listing the benefits of U.S. ratification of UNCLOS, such as continental
shelf resources and influence in the development of the law of the sea).
14. Infra Part II.
15. Infra Part III.
16. Infra Part IV.
17. Infra Part V.
18. Infra Part VI.
19. Infra Part VII.
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II. HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA
AND THE UNITED STATES
A brief historical overview of the origin and evolution of the convention
provides perspective on why UNCLOS is the appropriate legal regime for deep
seabed mining. UNCLOS’ history also demonstrates why the proposal in this
Comment is necessary to advance the interests of the U.S. and to help maintain
the U.S.’s perceived role as a world leader in the development of the rule of law
in the oceans.20
This Part provides a historical overview of UNCLOS’ development.21
Section II.A will discuss the Freedom of the High Seas Doctrine.22 Section II.B
will discuss the origin and development of UNCLOS.23 Section II.C will briefly
go over the U.S. interim regulatory framework known as the Deep Seabed Hard
Minerals Resources Act.24 Section II.D summarizes the U.S. political support in
favor of the ratification of UNCLOS.25
A. Freedom of the High Seas Doctrine
In 1608, the Freedom of the High Seas Doctrine (High Seas Doctrine) was
created in response to the susceptibility by nations to lay claims of territorial
ownership and sovereign control on the high seas.26 The High Seas Doctrine was
developed by Hugo Grotius, also known as the “father of international law,” in
recognition of his prediction that “if States began treating the high seas in the
same way as land territory,” it may lead to “the risk of a full-blown armed
conflict.”27 The High Seas Doctrine set forth the concept that a nation’s rights
and jurisdiction over the oceans was limited to only a “narrow belt of sea
surrounding a nation’s coastline.”28
In accordance with the High Seas Doctrine, the vast remainders of the high
seas were “proclaimed to be free to all and belonging to none.”29 The High Seas
20. Pedrozo, supra note 12, at 771. The U.S. has historically been known as a world leader in the rule of
law in the oceans.
21. Infra Part II.A–B.
22. Infra Part II.A.
23. Infra Part II.B.
24. Infra Part II.C.
25. Infra Part II.D.
26. See James Brosseau, Frozen in Time: A Fresh Look at the Law of the Sea and Why the United States
Continues to Fight Against It, 42.1 S.U. L. REV. 143, 147 (2014) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review) (explaining the background behind the Freedom of the High Seas Doctrine).
27. See id. (providing the impetus for the creation of the High Seas Doctrine).
28. See UNITED NATIONS, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA (A HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE), ¶ 1 (last visited Oct. 27, 2015), available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_
agreements/convention_historical_perspective.htm#HistoricalPerspective (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review) (providing the purpose of the High Seas Doctrine).
29. Id.

320

The University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 48
Doctrine became “one of the first firmly established areas of customary
international law” in the world and prospered well into the 20th century.30
Unfortunately, with the discovery of deep sea resources in the mid-20th century,
nations began to lay claims outside the traditional jurisdiction set forth in the
High Seas Doctrine.31 By 1967, the once peaceful waters brought by the High
Seas Doctrine became turbulent due to advancements in technology, the
realization of deep sea resources, and the “super-power rivalry” among nations.32
B. The Birth of the Constitution of the Sea
Global success in the exploitation of deep sea resources led a number of
nations to lay claims of ownership over resources on and below the continental
shelf within their respective jurisdictions.33 It was not until the early 20th century
that nations realized a legal framework for the sea was desirable when it became
technologically and economically feasible to extract resources like oil deposits
from beneath the oceans.34 At the end of World War II, there was an international
consensus to avoid future conflicts through the codification of an international
legal doctrine regarding the seas.35
On November 1, 1967, Arvid Pardo, Malta’s Ambassador to the United
Nations, called for:
[A]n effective international regime over the seabed and the ocean floor
beyond a clearly defined national jurisdiction. It is the only alternative by
which we can hope to avoid the escalating tension that will be inevitable
if the present situation is allowed to continue.36
In 1973, the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea was
held in New York, sparking initial negotiations towards the creation of the legal
regime envisioned by Mr. Pardo.37 This legal regime was to replace the High
Seas Doctrine with a system based on the common heritage of mankind to benefit

30. See Brosseau, supra note 26, at 147–48 (describing the High Seas Doctrine and its effect for nearly
three centuries).
31. See UNITED NATIONS, supra note 28, at ¶ 1 (describing the decline of the High Seas Doctrine due to
claims by seafaring nations for offshore resources).
32. See id. at ¶ 16 (listing the reasons why the peace brought by the High Seas Doctrine eroded).
33. Brosseau, supra note 26, at 148–49 (explaining the legal environment pre-UNCLOS); UNITED
NATIONS, supra note 28, at ¶¶ 3–6. Following the U.S. President Harry S. Truman’s unilateral claim of its
continental shelf; Argentina, Chile, Peru, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Venezuela, Indonesia,
the Philippines, and some Eastern European countries followed suit and asserted their sovereign rights over
ocean areas off the coast of their borders.
34. See Brosseau, supra note 26, at 148 (describing the origins of UNCLOS).
35. See id. at 150 (describing the origins of UNCLOS).
36. UNITED NATIONS, supra note 28, at ¶ 17.
37. Id. at ¶¶ 18–19.
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the international community.38 Through the collaboration of over 150
delegations, including the U.S., and nine years of negotiations, a comprehensive
legal structure governing ocean use was developed. 39 This legal regime was
UNCLOS.40 During the nine years of negotiations, the U.S. was a “principal
broker of consensus on many of the key issues”41 leading to the ultimate
agreement for the 1982 version of UNCLOS.42
Despite the U.S.’s substantial influence and involvement in developing
UNCLOS,43 President Ronald Reagan declined to sign the treaty, mostly due to
the deep seabed provisions of the treaty.44 Specifically, Part XI of UNCLOS
addressed the ocean’s seabed that stretched beyond any nation’s jurisdiction.45
The crux of the U.S.’s apprehension in endorsing the treaty revolved around Part
XI’s treatment of the seabed beyond any national jurisdiction as the “common
heritage of mankind.”46 In doing so, Part XI subjected members of the treaty to
“international taxes and technology transfers on seabed mining ventures to
support developing and landlocked countries,” and “established a new
international organization to conduct its own seabed mining,” the International
Seabed Authority (ISA).47
President Reagan’s statement on the U.S.’s participation in the Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea listed changes “necessary to correct
38. Martin Harry, The Deep Seabed: The Common Heritage of Mankind or Arena for Unilateral
Exploitation?, 40 NAVAL L. REV. 207, 210 (1992) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). Mr.
Pardo’s call for a change was to replace the Freedom of the Seas doctrine with one based on the “common
heritage of mankind” concept.
39. Pedrozo, supra note 12, at 759. UNCLOS was negotiated from 1973–1982 by more than 150
delegations to balance the interests of nations to control activities off their coasts and their use of the oceans.
40. Id. UNCLOS was negotiated from 1973–1982 by more than 150 delegations to balance the interests
of nations to control activities off their coasts and their use of the oceans.
41. See John Briscoe & Peter Prows, The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea Turns 27, and American
Ratification Is Not in Sight—Still, BERK. J. INT’L L. (Nov. 5, 2008), available at http://bjil.typepad.
com/publicist/2009/03/publicist01-briscoe-prows.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review)
(describing the U.S. as a leader in the development of the Law of the Sea and, thanks to the U.S.’s experience
with building the structure of the modern Law of the Sea, it was an influential party involved in the
development of UNCLOS).
42. Id.
43. David D. Caron & Harry N. Scheiber, The United States and the 1982 Law of the Sea Treaty, AM.
SOC’Y INT’L L. (Jun. 11, 2007), available at http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/11/issue/16/united-states-and1982-law-sea-treaty (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). The U.S. administrations of
Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter all played a leading role in the negotiations of UNCLOS up until 1982.
44. See Brosseau, supra note 26, at 150 (despite its involvement, the U.S. refused to sign the treaty due to
problems with the deep seabed provisions of the treaty).
45. See Briscoe & Prows, supra note 41 (identifying the concerns the U.S. had with Part XI of UNCLOS
in 1982).
46. See id. (identifying the concerns the U.S. had with Part XI of UNCLOS in 1982).
47. See id.; see also INTERNATIONAL SEABED AUTHORITY, ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL SEABED
AUTHORITY (last visited Nov. 3, 2015), available at https://www.isa.org.jm/authority (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review) (discussing UNCLOS and that the 1994 Agreement created the ISA as an
autonomous international organization to organize and control activities within the seabed, ocean floor, and
subsoil beyond the limits of any nation’s jurisdiction).
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those unacceptable elements” of UNCLOS.48 In 1994, UNCLOS was
renegotiated, and several influential U.S. political figures acknowledged that the
renegotiation resolved the “unacceptable elements” noted by Reagan.49 Despite
this, opponents of UNCLOS still believe the 1994 Agreement Relating to the
Implementation of Part XI of the Convention (Implementation Agreement)
remains flawed.50 Specifically, opponents are concerned with the following: the
lack of any U.S. “veto” power over all ISA decisions, risks to U.S. economic
interests; subjecting U.S. companies to an “unaccountable international
bureaucracy”; and the possibility that foreign interests would dominate over U.S.
interests.51
C. Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Resources Act
In 1980, the U.S. established an interim regulatory system for deep seabed
hard mineral resource development known as the Deep Seabed Hard Minerals
Resource Act (DSHMRA).52 The purpose of the act was “to be temporary,
pending the entry into force of the United States of the [Law of the Sea]
Convention including a deep seabed regime.”53 The U.S. Act asserts that:
It is the legal opinion of the United States that exploration for and
commercial recovery of hard mineral resources of the deep seabed are freedoms
of the high seas subject to a duty of reasonable regard to the interests of other

48. President Ronald Reagan’s Statement on United States Participation in the Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea, at 1–2 (Jan. 29, 1982), available at http://www.jag.navy.mil/organization/
documents/Reagan%20statement%20on%20US%20participation%20in%20the%20Third%20United%20Nation
s%20Conference%20on%20the%20Law%20of%20the%20Sea.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific
Law Review) [hereinafter Reagan’s UNCLOS Statement]. President Reagan criticized UNCLOS and listed
necessary changes to the treaty that: 1) will not deter development of any deep seabed mineral resources to meet
national and world demand; 2) will assure national access to these resources by current and future qualified
entities to enhance U.S. security of supply, to avoid monopolization of the resources by the operating arm of the
International Authority, and to promote the economic development of the resources; 3) will provide a decisionmaking role in the deep seabed regime that fairly reflects and effectively protects the political and economic
interests and financial contributions of participating states; 4) will not allow for amendments to come into force
without approval of the participating states, including in our case the advice and consent of the Senate; 5) will
not set other undesirable precedents for international organizations; and 6) will be likely to receive the advice
and consent of the Senate. In this regard, the convention should not contain provisions for the mandatory
transfer of private technology and participation by and funding for national liberation movements.
49. See Part II.C.; see id. at 1–2 (listing the problems with the 1982 treaty that needed to resolved before
any ratification by the U.S.); see also THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, U.N. CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE
SEA: IT’S STILL A BAD IDEA (Jul. 7, 2011), available at http://www.heritage.org/research/factsheets/2011/07/unconvention-on-the-law-of-the-sea-its-still-a-bad-idea (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review)
[hereinafter BAD IDEA] (providing a summary of reasons why the treaty is still a bad idea despite the 1994
revisions).
50. See BAD IDEA, supra note 49.
51. Id.
52. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1401–73 (1980).
53. Johnathan I. Chamey, U.S. Provisional Application of the 1994 Deep Seabed Agreement, 88 AM. J.
INTL. L. 705, 710 (1994). DSHMRA was only intended to be a temporary regime.
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states in their exercise of those and other freedoms recognized by general
principles of international law. [emphasis added]54
As a result of DSHMRA, the U.S. will continue to follow the High Seas
Doctrine55 with respect to deep seabed mining activities but will continue to lack
an international voice on deep seabed mining until Congress ratifies UNCLOS.56
D. U.S. Political Support to Ratify UNCLOS
In response to the previous objections of the U.S. and other states over Part
XI, UNCLOS was revised in July 1994 by “[doing] away with the technology
transfers, sharply limit[ing] the [international organization], and significantly
restrict[ing] the original seabed mining taxes.”57 This was done, in large part, to
end the impasse initiated by the U.S. and supported by other developed countries
that opposed the original deep seabed provisions.58 President Bill Clinton signed
the treaty after the revisions were made to Part XI.59 However, the U.S. Senate
ultimately refused to ratify the treaty.60
On November 27, 2001, Ambassador Sichan Siv, the U.S. Representative on
the U.N. Economic and Social Council, provided the following statement to the
U.N. General Assembly:
The United States has long accepted the UN Convention on the Law of
the Sea as embodying international law concerning traditional uses of the
oceans. The United States played an important role in negotiating the
Convention, as well as the 1994 Agreement that remedied the flaws in
Part XI of the Convention on deep seabed mining. Because the rules of
the Convention meet U.S. national security, economic, and
environmental interests, I am pleased to inform you that the
Administration of President George W. Bush supports accession of the
United States to the Convention.61

54. 30 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(12) (1980) (explaining the stance of the U.S. with regards to the treatment of
deep seabed minerals located outside of a nation’s jurisdiction).
55. See infra Part II.A.
56. 30 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(12) (1980) (explaining the stance of the U.S. with regards to the treatment of
deep seabed minerals located outside of a nation’s jurisdiction).
57. See Briscoe & Prows, supra note 41, at 1 (describing the revisions of the 1994 Implementing
Agreement to address the objections previously raised by President Reagan).
58. Agarwal, supra note 8, at 7.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. MARJORIE A. BROWNE, THE LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION AND U.S. POLICY, CRS BRIEF ISSUE FOR
CONGRESS 5 (Jun. 16, 2006), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IB95010.pdf (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
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On October 21, 2003, William Taft, then Legal Advisor of the U.S. State
Department, stated before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:
[C]hanges set forth in the 1994 Agreement over[came] each one of the
objections of the United States to Part XI of the Convention and [met]
our goal of guaranteed access by the U.S. industry to deep seabed
minerals and on the basis of reasonable terms and conditions. [emphasis
added].62
In September 2004, the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy issued 212
recommendations to the President and Congress, classifying U.S. accession to
UNCLOS as one of its “13 Critical Actions . . . [to] provide the foundation for a
comprehensive national ocean policy.”63
On May 15, 2007, former President George W. Bush issued a press release
indicating his support for the ratification of the treaty because “it will secure U.S.
sovereign rights over extensive marine areas, including the valuable natural
resources they contain . . . it will give the United States a seat at the table when
the rights that are vital to our interests are debated and interpreted.”64 Late in
2007, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee followed President Bush’s
support for the treaty by voting 17-4 in support of signing UNCLOS.65
On May 23, 2012, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton testified before
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to support the ratification of UNCLOS,
stating:
American companies are equipped and ready to engage in deep seabed
mining. But the United States can only take advantage of the Convention’s
provisions that accord security of tenure to mine sites in area beyond national
jurisdiction as a part to this treaty.66
In June 2012 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee heard witness
testimonies from six high-ranking military officials, four Admirals and two
Generals, who supported the ratification of UNCLOS.67 These military officials

62. Caron & Scheiber supra note 43, at 3.
63. BROWNE, supra note 61, at 5.
64. Press Release, President George W. Bush, President’s Statement on Advancing U.S. Interests in the
World’s Oceans (May 2007), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/
2007/05/20070515-2.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
65. See generally Kevin Drawbaugh, U.S. Senate Panel Backs Law of the Sea Treaty, REUTERS (Oct. 31,
2007), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/10/31/idUSN31335584 (on file with The University of
the Pacific Law Review) (reporting on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s support of UNCLOS).
66. Hillary R. Clinton, Secretary, U.S. Dept. of St., Accession to the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention and
Ratification of the 1994 Agreement Amending Part XI of the Law of the Sea Convention before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee 1–2 (May 23, 2012).
67. Press Release, John Kerry, U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Rel., Statement on “24 Star” Military
Witnesses Voice Strong Support for Law of the Sea Treaty (June 14, 2012), available at http://www.
foreign.senate.gov/press/chair/release/24-star-military-witnesses-voice-strong-support-for-law-of-the-sea-treaty
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pointed out major benefits, including: “solid[ifying] our global maritime
leadership”; “protecting American prosperity”; and “reinforce[ing] our leadership
role in shaping international maritime policy and overseeing peaceful economic
activity on and under our world’s seas and oceans.”68
Recently, at the United States’ Military Academy, West Point, President
Barack Obama remarked upon UNCLOS at the commencement ceremony for the
Class of 2014.69 President Obama urged the U.S. Senate to ratify UNCLOS to
maintain a strong American maritime influence, referring to the maritime dispute
in the South China Sea as an example. Furthermore, he stated “We can’t exempt
ourselves from the rules that apply [to] everybody else,” acknowledging the odd
position the U.S. is placed in when attempting to resolve maritime disputes
between members of UNCLOS while the U.S. remains an outsider to the treaty.70
Despite a number of testimonies and supportive statements by various political
and military figures who leverage a substantial amount of influence, the U.S. has
yet to ratify the treaty due to staunch conservative republican opposition.71
III. CURRENT UNCLOS DEEP SEABED MINING REGIME
Today, most nations are subject to the deep seabed mining regime controlled
by Part XI of UNCLOS and the Implementation Agreement.72 UNCLOS grants
the ISA the responsibility to manage and regulate all deep seabed mining
operations of its Member States.73 The ISA’s purpose is to develop and
implement rules and regulations that would “fill [the] gaps in the framework left

(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (issuing a press release summarizing the various points
made by six high ranking military officials in support of the ratification of the Law of the Sea Convention).
68. Id.
69. Barack Obama, President, United States, U.S. Dept. of St., Keynote Address at the United States
Military Academy Commencement (May 28, 2014), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2014/05/28/remarks-president-united-states-military-academy-commencement-ceremony (on file with
The University of the Pacific Law Review). President Obama noted that in order for American influence to
remain strong in maritime matters, that the United States Senate must ratify the Law of the Sea Convention.
70. Id.
71. See generally Briscoe & Prows, supra note 41 (summarizing the U.S.’s absence due to its nonratification stance towards UNCLOS); Thomas Wright, Outlaw of the Sea: The Senate Republicans’ UNCLOS
Blunder, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Aug. 7, 2012), available at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/oceans/201208-07/outlaw-sea (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). Republican opposition began with the
Regan administration and has continued to persevere. A group of 34 Republican senators, led by Senator Jim
DeMint, has promised to vote against UNCLOS, which is enough to make it impossible to obtain the required
two-thirds majority vote in the Senate to ratify UNCLOS.
72. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982 [hereinafter UNCLOS] (on file with
The University of the Pacific Law Review); 1994 Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, July 21, 2010 [hereinafter
Implementation Agreement] (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
73. UNCLOS, supra note 72, Article 157.
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by [UNCLOS].”74 Part XI was never intended to be a comprehensive and
complete legal code to guide the ISA in the management and regulation of deep
seabed mining.75 Instead, the deep seabed mining legal regime was meant to
evolve and develop over time as the expertise and knowledge of the deep seabed
grew.76
Most importantly, the extraction of minerals from the seabed is subject to
Part XI of UNCLOS and any rules and regulations adopted by the ISA.77 Article
137(2) provides the ISA substantial authority in determining the standards and
required practices in all aspects of deep seabed under the ISA’s jurisdiction.78 As
of 2015, the ISA issued four regulations with respect to rules, regulations, and
procedures regarding prospecting and exploration of marine minerals in the
international seabed area.79 This comprehensive set of rules is collectively known
as the “Mining Code.”80 The ISA has yet to issue any regulations on the
exploitation of mineral resources in the deep seabed.81
As of March 2015, the ISA prepared two consultation documents for its
members and stakeholders.82 These two documents provided a draft framework
for the regulation of deep seabed mineral exploitation, as well as a discussion
paper on the financial terms of the exploitation contracts.83
Throughout 2015, the ISA engaged with the Legal and Technical
Commission (LTC)84 and the Council85 in developing an action plan and draft

74. James Harrison, The International Seabed Authority and the Development of the Legal Regime for
Deep Seabed Mining, U. of Edinburgh School of Law Working Paper No. 2010/17 1 (May 17, 2010), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1609687 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. UNCLOS, supra note 72, art. 133, 134
78. Id. at art. 137(2); Harrison, supra note 74, at 7-8.
79. THE MINING CODE, THE INTERNATIONAL SEABED AUTHORITY, available at https://www.isa.org.jm/
mining-code/Regulations (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
80. Id.
81. ONGOING DEVELOPMENT OF REGULATIONS ON EXPLOITATION OF MINERAL RESOURCES IN THE
AREA, THE INTERNATIONAL SEABED AUTHORITY (last visited Dec. 29, 2015), available at
https://www.isa.org.jm/legal-instruments/ongoing-development-regulations-exploitation-mineral-resources-area
[hereinafter ONGOING DEVELOPMENT] (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. UNCLOS supra note 72, art. 161 and 165. The Legal and Technical Commission is composed of 15
Member States, elected by the Council who are qualified in the areas of the exploration for and exploitation and
processing of mineral resources, oceanology, protection of the marine environment, or economic or legal
matters relating to ocean mining and related fields of expertise. With their expertise, the LTC will make
recommendations to the Council of a variety of matters ranging from preparing assessments of environmental
implications of activities in the deep seabed to the formulation and submission of rules and regulations related
to activities in the deep seabed.
85. UNCLOS supra note 72, art. 161–62. The Council consists of 36 members of the ISA elected by the
Assembly to act as the executive organ of the ISA. The Council has the power to establish specific policies to
be pursued by the ISA.
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framework for the exploitation regulations.86 Furthermore, the Council called for
expanding the participation in the development of these regulations to a broader
audience to include other Member States.87 The Council also directed the LTC to
develop exploitation regulations as a priority for 2016.88
IV. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN DEEP SEABED MINING TECHNOLOGY
Advancements in deep seabed mining technology, primarily driven by
Nautilus Minerals Inc., are encouraging the development and international
recognition of the ISA’s legal framework.89 As the prominent international actor,
Nautilus’ involvement with the ISA reinforces the role of the ISA as the
international regulatory body ensuring that deep seabed mining activities in
international waters are protected and legitimate.90
This Part will introduce recent technological developments that are
cultivating and fostering the development of the ISA’s legal framework.91
Section IV.A will introduce Nautilus Minerals Inc., a company spearheading
recent efforts to make deep seabed mining viable on the commercial market.92
Section IV.B will delve into the significance and inevitability of deep seabed
mining.93
A. Nautilus Minerals Inc. and Commercial Mining of the Deep Seabed
Nautilus Minerals Inc. (Nautilus), a well-known member of the international
mining community, touted itself as “the first company to commercially explore
the seafloor for massive sulfide systems, a potential source of high grade copper,
gold, zinc, and silver.”94 Nautilus initially advanced the Solwara 1 Project, a deep
seabed mining proposal in July 2008.95 The project made great strides towards

86. ONGOING DEVELOPMENT, supra note 81.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. NAUTILUS MINERALS, OVERVIEW, www.nautilusminerals.com/irm/content/overview.aspx?RID=252
(last visited Dec. 28, 2015) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); Large machines for Ocean
floor mining will begin field tests in 2016, NEXTBIGFUTURE (Dec. 24, 2015), www.nextbigfuture.com/2015/12/
large-machines-for-ocean-mining-will.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); Luke
Burgess, The Future of Mining is at the Bottom of the Ocean, ENERGY & CAPITAL (Dec. 28, 2015),
www.energyandcapital.com/articles/the-future-of-mining-is-at-the-bottom-of-the-ocean/5262 (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
90. Id.
91. Infra Part IV.
92. Infra Part IV.A.
93. Infra Part IV.B.
94. Id.
95. David Gwyther, Environmental Impact Statement: Solwara 1 Project 1 (Sept. 2008), available at
http://www.nautilusminerals.com/irm/content/pdf/environment-reports/Environmental%20Impact%20Statement%
20Executive%20Summary%20(English).pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
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reaching its goal of commencing seabed mining operations during the first
quarter of 2018.96
The location of the Solwara 1 Project lies within Papua New Guinea’s
exclusive economic zone (EEZ)97 and, therefore, is not subject to UNCLOS or
the ISA’s jurisdiction.98 Although UNCLOS and the ISA lack jurisdiction, the
success of this project has significant implications for the future of deep seabed
mining in the Area.99 Under UNCLOS, the Area means the seabed and ocean
floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.100 Nautilus
has already obtained exploration licenses from the ISA for zones in the Area.101
In addition, the promising progress made by Nautilus in Papua New Guinea has
been a driving force in compelling the ISA to create a legal framework to grant
deep seabed mining leases.102
B. Significance of the Looming Reality of Deep Seabed Mining
The realization that deep seabed mining technology is becoming less of a
pipedream generated considerable worldwide implications for all nations.103 For
the past 50 years, the development of equipment and techniques to explore and
exploit natural resources from the deep seabed has been noted as “one of the
great challenges to science and technology.”104 Prior to the Solwara 1 Project, the
possibility of sustainable mining operations for the commercial recovery of
minerals was non-existent.105 Currently, most technology for the exploration and
exploitation of the seabed has been viable only at shallow depths.106

96. See generally Burgess, supra note 89 (providing an update on the advances made by the Solwara 1
Project).
97. UNCLOS, supra note 72, art. 55–57. The exclusive economic zone is an area beyond and adjacent to
the territorial sea, subject to the rights and jurisdiction of the coastal State. The coastal State has the sovereign
rights to explore and exploit this zone for its natural resources. This zone shall not extend beyond 200 nautical
miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.
98. Id.; David Shukman, Deep sea mining licenses issued, BBC NEWS (Jul. 23, 2014), available at
http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-28442640 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review); see also Gwyther, supra note 95, at 1. The seafloor massive sulfide deposits are located approximately
50 km (26.99 nautical miles) north of Rabaul, Papua New Guinea.
99. Id. see also UNCLOS, supra note 72, art. 1. The “Area” means the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil
thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
100. Id.
101. Jamie Smyth, Deep sea mining hopes hit by New Zealand Decision, FINANCIAL TIMES (Feb. 22,
2015), available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6edaeea8-b894-11e4-a2fb-00144feab7de.html#axzz3vje
USQht (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
102. Id.; supra Part III.
103. SEABED TECHNOLOGY, INTERNATIONAL SEABED AUTHORITY 1, 1 (last visited Dec. 29, 2015),
available at http://www.isa.org.jm/files/documents/EN/Brochures/ENG10.pdf (on file with The University of
the Pacific Law Review).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 3. Mining operations below ocean depths greater than 200 meters were not feasible.
106. Id.
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Nautilus, a business incorporated in Canada, which is a Member State of
UNCLOS since 2003,107 is under the purview of the ISA.108 Pursuant to Article
144 of UNCLOS and Section 5 of the Implementation Agreement, Nautilus is
encouraged to share its deep seabed mining technology with developing Member
States using “fair and reasonable commercial terms and conditions.”109 As a
result, Member States garner a significant technological opportunity over nonMember States, such as the U.S.110 Although not mandatory, these provisions
encourage cooperation between developing and developed Member States.111
Originally, the 1982 version of UNCLOS mandated private technology
transfers that could potentially be detrimental to a Member State’s national
security and economic interests.112 This requirement was effectively removed in
the Implementation Agreement in response to President Reagan’s criticism of
UNCLOS.113 As a result, Member States need not fear mandatory technology
transfers when facing a threat to their national security or economic interests.114
Furthermore, the act of obtaining exploration licenses through the ISA
further legitimizes and strengthens the legal framework being developed by the
ISA for deep seabed mining in the Area.115 As the poster child for the first
commercially viable deep seabed mining operation, Nautilus’s move to obtain
exploration permits through the ISA, rather than working around the ISA, the
confines of UNCLOS, and the Implementation Agreement, reinforces the ISA’s
legitimacy.116 In anticipation of the Solwara 1 Project’s success in early 2018,
Nautilus reported in their August 13, 2015 Investor Update that it began

107. UNITED NATIONS, DIVISION FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA, CHRONOLOGICAL
LISTS OF RATIFICATIONS OF, ACCESSIONS AND SUCCESSIONS TO THE CONVENTION AND THE RELATED
AGREEMENTS AS AT 02 JANUARY 2015, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/chronological
_lists_of_ratifications.htm (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); NAUTILUS MINERALS,
CORPORATE DIRECTORY, available at http://www.nautilusminerals.com/irm/content/corporate-directory.
aspx?RID=289 (last visited Oct. 22, 2016) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
108. SPU-EU DEEP SEA MINERALS PROJECT, INFORMATION BROCHURE 15, SECRETARIAT OF THE
PACIFIC COMMUNITY & THE INTERNATIONAL SEABED AUTHORITY 7 (Jul. 2013), available at http://gsd.spc.
int/dsm/images/pdf_files/dsm_brochures/DSM_Brochure15_ISA (on file with The University of the Pacific
Law Review).
109. UNCLOS, supra note 72, art. 144; see also Implementation Agreement, supra note 72.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Scott G. Borgerson, The National interest and the Law of the Sea, Council on Foreign Relations,
Council Special Report No. 46, 43–44 (May 2009), available at http://www.cfr.org/oceans/national-interestlaw-sea/p19156 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Smyth, supra note 101.
116. NAUTILUS MINERALS, supra note 89; NEXTBIGFUTURE, supra note 89; Burgess, supra note 89.
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exploration operations in the Solomon Island and the Clarion-Clipperton Zone
(CCZ).117
Based on the Solwara 1 Project, future deep seabed mining ventures operated
by Nautilus and similar entities will likely require a large amount of investment
capital.118 While investors may be protected due to Solwara 1’s location within a
coastal State’s EEZ, potential investors would be deterred absent the protection
of the ISA’s legal framework provided.119
Lockheed Martin, a U.S. based company, has been a large proponent of
recognizing the need for the ISA.120 In June 2012, the chairman of Lockheed
Martin sent a letter to the U.S. Senate stating, “[Lockheed Martin] wanted to join
the race for undersea riches, but could not assume investment risks until it was
clear that it would have a clear legal title to its findings.”121 Lockheed Martin
stated it is unwilling to do so absent U.S. ratification of UNCLOS.122
Lockheed Martin also participated in a 2012 movement known as The
American Sovereignty Campaign, which was comprised of members from the
government and private sector.123 The campaign’s goal was to send Congress a
message: that U.S. accession to UNCLOS would “invite economic opportunity,
create U.S. jobs, and protect business and commercial interests at home and
abroad.”124 Lockheed Martin is the only U.S. based holder of exploration licenses
granted by the ISA.125 Jennifer Warren, Vice President of Lockheed Martin
stated, “business initiatives to exploit deep seabed mineral resources will only be
able to secure the necessary financial investments if done pursuant to the existing
international framework,” referring to the legal structure created by the ISA and
UNCLOS.126

117. Mike Johnston, Nautilus Minerals Investor Update 7 (Aug. 13, 2015), available at www.
nautilusminerals.com/IRM/PDF/1648/ConferenceCallPresentation (on file with The University of the Pacific
Law Review).
118. Peter Koven, Nautilus Minerals Inc says it’s poised to begin undersea mining following dispute
settlement, FINANCIAL POST (June 25, 2014), available at http://business.financialpost.com/news/
mining/nautilus-minerals-inc-says-its-poised-to-begin-undersea-mining-following-dispute-settlement (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review); Ngaire McDiarmid, Seafloor, not the sky, is the limit,
MININGNEWS.NET (Dec. 9, 2015), available at http://www.miningnews.net/resource-stocks/companyprofiles/seafloor-not-the-sky-is-the-limit/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
119. Stewart Patrick, (Almost) Everyone Agrees: The U.S. Should Ratify the Law of the Sea Treaty, THE
ATLANTIC (June 10, 2012), available at http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/06/-almosteveryone-agrees-the-us-should-ratify-the-law-of-the-sea-treaty/258301/ (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Daisy R. Khalifa, Law of the Sea Goes Public, SEA POWER, at 16 (June 2012), available at
http://www.seapower-digital.com/seapower/201206?pg=18#pg18 (on file with The University of the Pacific
Law Review).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 18.
126. Id.
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The accomplishments and vision of the Solwara 1 Project and Nautilus’
future intentions to engage in deep seabed mining in the Area have two important
implications: 1) Member States of UNCLOS will likely be the ones to benefit
first from Nautilus’ deep seabed mining technology; and 2) without the backing
of the ISA and its legal framework to protect deep seabed mining claims,
investors will not risk financially supporting mining ventures that lack an ISA
exploration and mineral exploitation license.127
V. THE U.S. STANDS ALONE
Legal scholars from the 1980s forewarned that the U.S.’s inability to ratify
UNCLOS would be detrimental in the long-term.128 One of those scholars,
Steven J. Molitor, stated, “the [U.S.’s] rejection of the Convention reflects a
disappointing unwillingness to accept the contemporary world as one of global
interdependence.”129 Molitor went on to state that the U.S. “can no longer attempt
to dominate world affairs simply by imposing its views on other countries.”130
Lastly, Molitor warned that the U.S.’s “[failure] to recognize this crucial
geopolitical reality” would lead the U.S. “further into some form of international,
political, economic, and social isolation with the image of an international outlaw
or outcast.”131
Nearly 30 years later, the U.S. continues to work outside the international
framework of UNCLOS and, instead, enacted DSHMRA in 1980 as a temporary
framework to govern U.S. access to deep seabed minerals.132 The U.S. approach
relies heavily on a combination of DSHMRA, domestic law, and bilateral
agreements with other nations.133 This approach, as Molitor cautioned in 1987,
caused the U.S. to fall into further isolation from the rest of the world, as the
number of UNCLOS Member States has grown over the past 33 years.134
In the 1980s, the U.S. was a major influence in the evolution of UNCLOS.135
At that time, the U.S. obtained a temporary multilateral agreement, known as the
127. Supra Part IV.
128. Steven J. Molitor, The Provisional Understanding Regarding Deep Seabed Matters: An IllConceived Regime for U.S. Deep Seabed Mining, 20 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 224, 239 (1987); Elliot L. Richardson,
Interdependence X Political Necessity = The Need for Law, 75 PROC. AM. SOC’Y INT’L 206, 209 (1981).
129. Molitor, supra note 128, at 239. Molitor describes the dangers and consequences of the U.S.’s
rejection of UNCLOS in the 1980’s.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. John Alton Duff, UNCLOS and the New Deep Seabed Mining Regime: the Risks of Refuting the
Treaty, 19 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 1, 8 (1995); see also Part II.D.
133. Steven Groves, The U.S. Can Mine the Deep Seabed Without Joining the U.N. Convention on the
Law of the Sea, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Dec. 4, 2012), available at http://www.heritage.org/
research/reports/2012/12/the-us-can-mine-the-deep-seabed-without-joining-the-un-convention-on-the-law-ofthe-sea (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
134. Molitor, supra note 128, at 239.
135. Duff, supra note 132, at 8.
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Provisional Understanding Regarding Deep Seabed Mining (Provisional
Understanding), with Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy,
Japan, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.136 The purpose of the
Provisional Understanding was to resolve potential deep seabed mining claims in
the Area, with primary focus on the CCZ and the northeast Pacific Ocean.137 The
eight developed countries of the Provisional Understanding seemingly “desired
an agreement that would minimize bureaucratic interference by Third World
countries hoping to share the profits.”138
In response to the Provisional Understanding, the UNCLOS Preparatory
Commission was “deeply concerned that some States have undertaken certain
actions which undermine the Convention.”139 The declaration by the Preparatory
Commission rejected any regime that was “incompatible with [UNCLOS] and its
related resolutions shall not be recognized” [emphasis added].140 In addition, the
Preparatory Commission deemed the Provisional Understanding “wholly illegal”
and rejected any recognition of it or any claims made by any party to it.141 It soon
became apparent that this approach had significant shortcomings, and by the
1990’s every U.N. member but the U.S. ratified UNCLOS.142
Today, the number of industrialized and developing nations acceded to
UNCLOS has grown to 167.143 As the U.S. continues its isolationist attitude, its
influence as a world leader in shaping the law of the oceans continues to diminish
and leaves American companies at a competitive disadvantage compared to those
who are members of UNCLOS.144
VI. TO ACCEDE OR NOT TO ACCEDE?
Opponents of UNCLOS believe that the U.S. may continue to conduct
mining activities in the Area, and that U.S. interests are better served by not
acceding to the treaty.145 Critics also state that Implementation Agreement never
really fixed Reagan’s list of “unacceptable elements” of UNCLOS.146
136. Id. at 9.
137. Id. at 8.
138. Molitor, supra note 128, at 226.
139. UNITED NATIONS, DECLARATION ADOPTED BY THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION ON 30 AUGUST
1985 (LOS/PCN/72) 85–86 (Oct. 1985), available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/doalos_publications/
LOSBulletins/bulletinpdf/bulE6.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. DIVISION FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 107.
143. Id.
144. Khalifa, supra note 123, at 19.
145. See generally Groves, supra note 133 (discussing the reasons why accession to UNCLOS would be
detrimental to U.S. interests and why the U.S. can operate deep seabed mining without being a member to the
treaty).
146. Reagan’s UNCLOS Statement, supra note 48 (providing a list of “unacceptable elements” from the
treaty that caused Reagan to reject UNCLOS in 1982).
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The Heritage Foundation (Heritage), an American conservative think tank,
has been a highly influential and stalwart opponent of UNCLOS since the days of
the Reagan administration.147 Heritage significantly influenced the Reagan
Administration through its 1981 publication “Mandate for Leadership.”148 Nearly
two-thirds of Heritage’s 2,000 proposals were implemented or initiated by the
end of Reagan’s first year in office.149 Heritage’s partnership with Reagan and its
influence over his presidency was evidenced by statements made by both sides.150
At a dinner in December 1989, Reagan stated, “Heritage was a ‘vital force’ in
Washington during his Administration.”151 In a June 2004 article written by
Heritage, Heritage reported, “Ronald Reagan was one of the best friends The
Heritage Foundation ever had. We will miss him.”152 Addressing the issues and
flaws identified by Heritage would be a crucial starting point in swaying opinion
towards U.S. accession to UNCLOS.153
Heritage argues that the U.S. has much to lose in joining UNCLOS.154 First,
Heritage claims the U.S. would be under the authority of “another unaccountable
international bureaucracy” involving nothing but anti-U.S. interests like the
proceedings at the U.N. General Assembly.155 Secondly, Heritage purports that
the U.S. would have to transfer a “significant portion of any such royalties to the
ISA . . . to the so-called developing world, including corrupt and despotic
regimes.”156 Thirdly, Heritage believes U.S. economic interests are at risk.157
These risks include conflicting economic interests between the U.S. and
developing states and deterrence of U.S. companies from engaging in mining
activities because of UNCLOS’ encouragement of technology transfers.158 Lastly,
that while Implementation Agreement improved many portions of the treaty, it
still failed to secure “veto” power for the U.S. over ISA decisions.159
Although the concerns raised by Heritage are stated with the best intentions
to preserve and protect U.S. interests, these antiquated apprehensions are relics
147. THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, ABOUT HERITAGE, http://www.heritage.org/about (last visited Jan. 1,
2016) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
148. Andrew Blasko, Reagan and Heritage: A Unique Partnership, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (June 7,
2004), available at http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2004/06/reagan-and-heritage-a-uniquepartnership (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). “Mandate for Leadership” was a 1,100page publication written for President Reagan containing specific policy recommendations ranging from taxes,
regulation of trade, to national defense.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. BAD IDEA, supra note 49.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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left over from the Reagan Administration and have an adverse effect on U.S.
interests.160 The following sections, taken together, minimize and dispel the
trepidations raised by opponents of UNCLOS.161 Although the concerns by
opponents were well-founded, the growing international recognition and support
of the treaty over the past 30 years by both developed and developing nations is a
noteworthy indicator of how the Area will be regulated and governed.162
Opponents must face the reality that domestic political support for UNCLOS
existed since the treaty’s inception, and only a small minority is holding back the
U.S.’s interests.163
This Part will discuss three reasons why the U.S. should accede to
UNCLOS.164 Section VI.A provides a discussion on how accession to the treaty
will help the U.S. reclaim its former influence as a world leader in ocean law.165
Section VI.B explains the benefits to U.S. companies of U.S. ratification of
UNCLOS.166 Lastly, Section VI.C discusses the consequences to the U.S. if it
continues to remain a non-party to UNCLOS.167
A. Reclaiming its Former Influence as a World Leader in Shaping the Laws of
the Oceans
Advocates against U.S. accession believe it would disadvantage U.S.
interests and place the U.S. under the thumb of the ISA.168 The assertion that U.S.
interests will be lost in the sea of interests of the other 167 Member States is
misplaced.169 U.S. interests have not been represented, in part, due to its 33-year
absence.170 The deep seabed mining framework continued to develop and gain
popularity despite the U.S.’s absence.171 Only by acceding to UNCLOS, will the
U.S. regain its proper place as a world leader in shaping the law of the sea while
representing its own interests in the proper international arena—before the
ISA.172

160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Infra Part VI.
165. Infra Part VI.A.
166. Infra Part VI.B.
167. Infra Part VI.C.
168. BAD IDEA, supra note 49.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. DIVISION FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 107.
172. See generally Agarwal, supra note 8, at 12 (providing the benefits that will be realized when the
U.S. ratifies UNCLOS); see also Pedrozo, supra note 12, at 762–63 (listing out the benefits of a U.S.
ratification of UNCLOS, such as continental shelf resources and influence in the development of the law of the
sea).
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When the treaty was still gaining its sea legs, the U.S.’s influential impact
was evident through its ability to band seven industrialized nations173 into
forming the Provisional Understanding, an agreement that operated outside the
ISA’s purview.174 After the ISA declared the Provisional Understanding “wholly
illegal” under UNCLOS, all seven members of the treaty essentially abandoned
the U.S. and ratified the treaty in the 1990’s.175 The realization that the ISA’s
deep seabed mining was becoming increasingly appealing became a significant
factor in the U.S. diminishing influence over matters relating to the law of the
sea.176
Over the years, the U.S. unsuccessfully challenged other nations’ claims
outside of their respective EEZs.177 An ongoing example of this is China’s
abstruse claims in the South China Sea.178 The U.S. attempted to admonish
China’s South China Sea claims by “[insisting] that China must base its [South
China Sea] claims solely on the 1982 UNCLOS although the U.S. itself has not
ratified it.”179 The U.S.’s stance on the South China Sea debate is fully supported
by UNCLOS, although the U.S.’s challenges are empty without its accession.180
A more recent example involves the U.S.’s claims made in the Arctic.181
As of 2015, the U.S. assumed the chairmanship of the Arctic Council through
2017.182 The challenge the U.S. faces is its inability to evaluate other nations’
ECS183 claims in the Arctic, as well as filing its own ECS claims.184 Currently, all
of the Arctic Council’s Member States and its 12 observer States are parties to

173. Duff, supra note 132, at 9.
174. Id. The U.S. was able to obtain agreement with Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
Netherlands, and United Kingdom to respect each other’s deep seabed mining claims in the Area, outside the
jurisdiction of UNCLOS and the ISA.
175. See Part IV.B.
176. Pedrozo, supra note 12, at 774.
177. Id. at 771–74. The U.S. has been unable to challenge the Extended Continental Shelf claims of other
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UNCLOS, except the U.S.185 Furthermore, it is apparent that activities being
discussed within the Arctic Council will be guided by the provisions of
UNCLOS.186
By ratifying the treaty, the U.S. will not instantaneously regain its former
influence, but it will be a huge step in the right direction compared to its static
approach for the past three decades.187 Upon ratification, the U.S. will first regain
its seat on the ISA’s Council.188 In addition, the U.S. will gain “important veto
rights over distribution of any future revenues from deep seabed exploitation to
national liberation groups.”189
Not only will the U.S. regain a seat on the ISA’s Council, but also it will
have the ability to participate in the elections of judges for the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea,190 members of the Commission on the Limits of
the Continental Shelf (CLCS),191 and other arms of the ISA.192 This is a critical
opportunity for the U.S. to place its own representatives in key areas of the ISA
to help restore U.S. presence in vital matters concerning the Area.193
Furthermore, by reasserting itself as an authoritative component in the ISA, the
U.S. will be better able to sway other nations in the issuing of decisions by the
ISA.194 By taking this route versus obtaining a “veto” power over all ISA
decisions, the U.S. will be more respected by Member States rather than being
seen as a haughty and stubborn Western power as characterized by Molitor.195
The fear that U.S. interests will be dominated by the interests of other
Member States is overstated by critics of UNCLOS.196 U.S. accession will be a
landmark event in UNCLOS’ history and will make waves throughout the
international community.197 The reemergence of the U.S. will make a
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188. John Norton, Statement to the Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, United Nations Convention
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considerable impression and will only grow over time.198 Former U.S. Army
General and the 18th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Martin Dempsey,
stated the impact best when he said “We have the world’s largest and most
capable Navy, the world’s largest economy and the largest Exclusive Economic
Zone. We will become the leader within the Convention as soon as we enter it,
and that’s never been more important” [emphasis added].199 To properly reassert
itself as an influential player, relevant leader, and active participant in the affairs
of the oceans, the U.S. must accede to UNCLOS.200
B. Propelling U.S. Companies Back into the Game
Contrary to the belief that UNCLOS “discourage[s] U.S. companies from
participating in such [mining] activities,” there has been a call by U.S. companies
and business leaders to ratify the treaty as soon as possible.201 At the 2012 Forum
on the Law of the Sea held in Washington, Jennifer Warren, Vice President of
Lockheed Martin, expressed the company’s high interest in deep seabed
exploration and continued support of UNCLOS.202 Warren declared, “[r]ecent
developments in deep seabed resources have really sharpened our interest in
seeing the law of the Sea ratified as soon as possible.”203
Lockheed Martin currently benefits from UNCLOS and the ISA by acting
through its British subsidiary.204 Despite this workaround, the company’s actions
are symbolic of how important accession to the treaty is to the economic interests
of the U.S.205 First, Lockheed’s workaround shows a lack of confidence in the
current deep seabed mining regime provided by DSHMRA and the U.S.’s
multilateral and bilateral agreements with a select group of nations.206 Second, it
demonstrates the value U.S. companies place in security and predictability, both
of which are provided by the ISA and UNCLOS.207 Lastly, it validates the
significance of deep seabed resources.208 Warren’s statement summarized it best:
The importance of these resources is well understood internationally.
Other countries are moving forward quickly and aggressively to access
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them. As the only U.S.-based claimant, our view is pretty
straightforward. Business initiatives to exploit deep seabed mineral
resources will only be able to secure the necessary financial investments
if done pursuant to the existing international framework.209
In addition, John Ryan, Chief Legal Officer of Level 3 Communications,210
stated, “that any uncertainty inhibits economic growth and investment” when the
protection of infrastructure in international waters is not guaranteed.211 While the
rest of the world enjoys the benefits of UNCLOS and the ISA, the U.S. idly
stands by, watching other nations like China and Russia claim prime locations for
deep seabed mining activities.212
Lastly, U.S. companies are not subject to the mandatory technology transfer
requirements of Article 5 of Annex III of UNCLOS.213 As a result of
Implementation Agreement, Section 5 of the treaty has been replaced by a set of
general principles relating to technology transfers with a developing Member
State.214 Furthermore, the treaty includes language to prevent technology
transfers in the event it poses a national security risk to the U.S.215 Article 302
states: “[N]othing in this Convention shall be deemed to require a State Party, in
the fulfillment of its obligations under this Convention, to supply information the
disclosure of which is contrary to the essential interests of its security.”216
Only through the ratification of UNCLOS will the U.S. be able to truly
provide American companies with the support and competitive edge that they
have been craving for three decades.217 Without the risk of mandatory technology
transfers, U.S. companies have nothing to lose and much to gain from the
stability and predictability UNCLOS provides.218 To avoid losing American jobs
to foreign locations like the U.K., the U.S. needs to accede to UNCLOS to help
foster a deep seabed mining industry for U.S. companies and create jobs in this
potentially lucrative and emerging industry.219
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C. Standing by Idly will be Detrimental to the U.S.
As time passes by, so too will opportunities for the U.S.220 The developing
deep seabed mining industry is slowly being recognized internationally as a
promising source for rare earths and minerals.221 U.S. companies and their
investors will not risk engaging in deep seabed mining operations without the
insurance and stability provided by the ISA’s developing mining regime.222
Regardless of the U.S.’s own deep seabed mining regime under DSHMRA, U.S.
companies lack the confidence in the U.S.’s current mining regime and instead
look to foreign UNCLOS Member States.223
Since the mid 1990’s, the U.S. experienced a steady decline in its sphere of
influence in the arena of ocean law and deep seabed resources.224 In 1982, the
U.S. was one of the most prominent influences and contributors to UNCLOS.225
The U.S. once wielded enough influence and authority that the drafters of
UNCLOS addressed the original misgivings of the Reagan administration
through the Implementation Agreement.226 But when the U.S. chose a different
path in 1998, it inadvertently surrendered its influential voice in the rulemaking
affairs of the world’s oceans.227
Without its seats on the various arms of the ISA, any call for change by the
U.S. relating to ocean affairs will fall on deaf ears.228 President Obama pointed
out that “[I]t’s a lot harder to call on China to resolve its maritime disputes under
the Law of the Sea Convention when the United States Senate has refused to
ratify it.”229 Regardless of the U.S. Senate’s refusal to ratify the treaty, “top
decision and policy makers [continue] to operate under the spirit of the law”
provided by UNCLOS.230 The U.S. Senate must realize that despite its continued
reservations of UNCLOS, members of political, security, and economic
communities in the U.S. recognize the tremendous value in UNCLOS.231
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Lockheed Martin has already sent American jobs outside the U.S. in order to
obtain the benefits from ISA Member States.232 As 2018 approaches, the eyes of
the world will turn its focus on Nautilus’ attempt to successfully operate the
world’s first deep seabed mining operation.233 The success of the Solwara 1
Project will usher in a new era of opportunity for all, excluding non-ratifying
States like the U.S.234 The probable response by other U.S. companies would be
to follow Lockheed Martin’s footsteps, triggering the trend of utilizing foreign
subsidiaries to operate deep seabed mining businesses, to the detriment of the
United States.235
VII. CONCLUSION
It is time to take action. The U.S. can no longer afford to idly stand by and
watch as the rest of the world takes full advantage of UNCLOS and the stability
and predictability afforded by the ISA.236 While there may be some portions of
UNCLOS that may not align with U.S. interests, it is not the time for the U.S. to
shy away from the opportunity to take its seat at the ISA and restore its former
role as a world leader in the evolution of the legal regime governing deep seabed
mining and other ocean affairs.
Various members of U.S. political, security, and economic communities have
spoken, and it is time for the U.S. Senate to listen.237 By ratifying UNCLOS, the
U.S. Senate can help secure and preserve U.S. deep seabed mining interests and
drive the U.S. in the direction of reestablishing itself as a global leader in the
perpetual evolution of the law of the seas.238
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